Australia and China need to talk about ocean governance

Despite their ideological differences, Australia and China share certain goals for ocean governance. Both nations want to mitigate the impacts of climate change, curb illegal fishing, and ensure safe access to energy resources. Prioritising negotiation on these non-military issues would improve governance while building a healthier regional order, Edward Chan writes. 

Read time: 6 mins

By Edward Chan, a Postdoral Fellow in China Studies at ANU.

Australia is worried that China is disrupting and reshaping our region’s maritime order.  

There are plenty of examples Australia can point to. Chinese coast guards have obstructed Southeast Asian countries’ access to their maritime resources. China has also constructed artificial islands, contributed to environmental degradation, and heightened its presence in the Pacific and Antarctica (often under the guise of scientific research). 

In this context, Australia perceives itself as a proponent of a ‘rules-based order’, protecting open markets, adherence to international law, cooperation, and open and democratic governance. We actively engage in international institutions to shape maritime norms. 

Regionally, Australia has long aimed to be a good maritime neighbour. Australia has assisted Pacific Island countries in establishing their maritime zones, negotiated shared boundaries, and submitted extended continental shelf claims, as well as contributed to sea level rise responses in the region. 

China, on the other hand, has traditionally viewed itself as a land-based power, but in recent years its posture has shifted. In 2012, it officially declared its goal to be a ‘strong maritime state’, and with the thirteenth five-year plan in 2016, its interest in oceans governance emerged even more prominently. In 2019, President Xi Jinping introduced the concept of a ‘maritime community of common destiny’ at the Chinese Navy’s 70th anniversary.  

China perceives existing mechanisms of oceans governance as ineffective and fragmented. It’s pointed to overlapping and limited regional and international institutions, jurisdictions, and mechanisms for governing the maritime domain. It’s also been calling for greater equality in accessing marine resources. 

Most likely, the Chinese government views these shortcomings as an opportunity to behave like a great power. It does have legitimate non-military maritime concerns – primarily domestic fishery management and water pollution – but ultimately, its engagement is on advancing its interests internationally. 

In short, Australia sees itself as a custodian of the rules-based order, casting China as challenging the status quo regional structure. Conversely, China claims that this maritime order is unfair and must change. 

But this isn’t necessarily a cause for alarm. 

These might seem like large differences, but they may be more perceptual than material. And despite contrasting views on many security matters, China and Australia share some goals and challenges for the region’s ocean governance. 

These include the sustainability of aquaculture resources and the need to adapt to climate change. Both nations also face similar domestic challenges in maritime governance. Australia is grappling with unclear lines of jurisdiction between federal and state governments, which can lead to confusion and inaction. Similarly, China has maritime operations duplicated by different arms of the state. Despite their differences, the two nations might be able to learn from each other’s experiences. 

And while Australia and China diverge on the legitimacy of the rules-based order, they do share a more general concern about consistency in the region’s maritime norms. They should commit to constructive dialogue and negotiate potential reforms that could provide this consistency. 

How policymakers could respond. 

To make this work, policymakers should broaden Australia’s view of China in maritime security policy. While China’s expanding influence in critical maritime domains like the South China Sea, South Pacific, and Antarctica is a risk factor, an approach that purely considers potential military defence is insufficient. Rather, they should be aware of China’s ambition in promoting its own maritime norms. 

It’s demonstrative that while the Department of Defence’s latest National Defence Strategy frequently highlights Australia’s role in managing China in the Indo-Pacific, the Department of Home Affairs’ Civil Maritime Security Strategy overlooks it. Issues like sustainable marine resource management, which China claims that it’s trying to champion, hold strategic significance for Australia and warrant more attention. 

A more proactive approach. 

As such, Australia should take a more proactive approach to engaging with China on these areas of mutual maritime concern. Given the delicacy and complexity at play in ocean governance, utilising multilateral forums will be crucial. At the same time, Australia can call for China to be more transparent in non-military and non-disputed matters. 

Following Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to Australia in March 2024, China has indicated a willingness to launch a dialogue on maritime affairs with Australia. In entering this dialogue, it’s possible to acknowledge ideological divides and yet still find paths to collaboration.  

Rather than trying in vain to exclude China from ocean governance in the Indo-Pacific, Australia should find ways to negotiate with this rising maritime power through established rules-based systems. This has the best chance of improving ocean governance in the region, all while strengthening those institutions and ultimately fostering a peaceful, stable, and secure Indo-Pacific. 

Authored by

Dr

ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.